Prachatai

The issue of autonomy has been steadily gaining interest and is now a serious consideration as a means of mitigating the long-running conflict in the southern border provinces. This is a positive step towards finding a political solution to the conflict because, short of a Carthaginian Peace, there is no military option for a solving an armed insurgency which rejects the legitimacy of the state. Yet autonomy is not a magical political solution to the complex problems fuelling unrest. Autonomy is subject to a number of complicated problems which could either derail the process or result in an autonomy agreement so watered down that any final agreement is void of any meaningful political powers. Such complications raise the spectre of autonomy failing to address core grievances of unrest and could further strain relations between Bangkok and the southern border provinces. While concerns don’t totally negate autonomy, issues such as national political conflict, sovereignty, the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim community, the role of the international community, a weak judicial system, and the future of Thai-Buddhist community are all issues which must be addressed should autonomy help bring a lasting peace to Thailand’s troubled deep south. 

The most pressing issue, and indeed most soul-searching for the Thai nation, is whether the conflict in the southern border provinces is a unique issue specific to the region or a symptom of a broader political ailment afflicting Thailand. The ethnic and religious cleavages in the Malay-Muslim provinces might be complicating factors but at the heart of the problem is a broken relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled. While a more extreme symptom in the border provinces, the same problematic relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled is reflected in national political conflict. The struggle, simplified by the color-coded street protests, might be fuelled by a myriad of factors but at the heart of the struggle is the problematic issue of legitimacy for those in power. How this relates to the autonomy debate in the south rests upon the fundamental distinction of how to address the root cause of conflict. If the apparently disparate conflicts in the southern border provinces and national political turmoil are indeed symptoms of a broader political ailment afflicting the nation then a special autonomy agreement fails to address the larger national illness while superficially treating the symptoms in the southern border provinces. This is obviously a complex issue but it is a consideration that must decide between a special autonomy arrangement for the symptoms in the southern border provinces or the treatment of the political illness afflicting the nation. A final consideration in this equation is the fact that national political conflict has drawn Bangkok’s focus away from addressing the southern crisis which means that peace in Bangkok is a likely prerequisite for peace in the Deep South. 

The next issue will be for autonomy to disassociate itself from the sensitive issue of sovereignty. Autonomy is not synonymous with independence. Autonomy is only a political devise that allows a distinct ethnic or social group to exercise political control over affairs of special concern to them while maintain the unity of the state and allowing the state to maintain political control over issues of common/national interest. But, as just demonstrated, autonomy has a clumsy definition and the distinction between autonomy and independence is often lost or purposely obfuscated by powerful opponents of autonomy. Royal Thai Army Commander-in-chief Anupong Paojinda recently did this in November 2009 [Link: http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/27895/army-takes-a-hard-line-with-rebels] when responding to Puea Thai chairman Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s suggestion of autonomy in the deep south by saying "the insurgents want to separate our land and set up an autonomous area". For autonomy to gain more political momentum it is essential that the Thai nation not only understand what autonomy is but also understand why it is necessary, how it has potential to address local grievances, and most importantly, how it does not threaten Thailand’s sovereignty.

Another pressing issue is the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim population. Due to the history of separatist struggle and the authority’s subsequent heavy-handed reaction to the separatist challenge, there is a distinct lack of political voice emanating out of the southern border provinces. Essentially, the distinction between legitimate political expression and violent separatism has been lost, which has prevented locals from openly expressing political opinions and airing their grievances for fear of being labeled a separatist. While the gagging of political voice is a barrier for transforming violent struggle into legitimate non-violent political participation, a lack of political voice also complicates the drive towards autonomy because there are only a limited number of elites which claim to be the voice of the large and diverse community. This could result in an elite-driven autonomy agreement that might serve the few Malay-Muslim leaders who stand to be the primary beneficiaries of increased political devolution but could fail to serve the majority of southern residents. The distinct problem is that an elite-driven process could result in an agreement that divides the state’s resources and position of political power amongst elites but fails to address local grievances and governance preferences which would undermine the long-term peace that advocates of autonomy are hoping for. While an elite driven process is the more likely scenario, this process should also be accompanied by a detailed public opinion survey designed to reveal the political inclinations of southern citizens, to understand their concerns and grievances, and to infuse those issues into the details of an autonomy agreement. 

Another consideration in the autonomy question will be the role of the international community. International assistance in helping Thailand resolve the southern insurgency has been fiercely resisted by both the government and the military. Yet the role of the international community should be reevaluated. The first stage in reevaluating the role of the international community is to understand that a large intervention is not being called for. The type of international assistance that is more likely would be technical and academic and designed to use shared experiences with utilizing autonomy arrangements to address ethno-religious conflicts while maintaining a state’s unity. Countries like Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom have similar experiences with creating autonomy-based solutions to separatist challenges and could provide considerable technical insight into process and design issues which would directly correlate with the durability and success of an autonomy agreement. Additionally, such countries also share the experience of being constitutional monarchies and understand how these institutions need not be negatively reflected upon. Finally, the international community can provide assistance as a non-partisan negotiation facilitator that can provide considerable value in helping get stakeholders to the table and build an equitable accommodation designed to address the diverse communities and address the multifaceted grievances fueling unrest. 

Thailand’s judicial system will be a problematic area for the future of an autonomy agreement. While Thailand does have functioning judicial system there is concern that issues of partisanship could complicate a future agreement. Autonomy agreements are complex and require frequent negotiation between the center and the autonomous zone. These negotiations can largely be adjudicated through the legal system should all parties have faith in the impartiality of the courts. Yet, since the resurgence of violence in 2004, there has not been a single prosecution of security forces for human rights abuses. The lack of prosecution has been raised by some in the border provinces as an example of judicial inequality. The problem that this raises for the prospect of a future autonomy agreement is that the court’s adjudication process is not understood by some stakeholders as a nonpartisan venue for negotiating the adjustments needed between the center and the autonomous zone. This raises the specter of extra-judicial negotiations taking place in either non-transparent elite negotiations or through a return to violence. Those designing an agreement need to be cognizant of the challenges posed by the country’s democratic and legal systems. Importantly, the details of autonomy would need to be clear, have considerable support of the wide range of stakeholders, and would need to include guidelines for resolving conflicts and providing adjustments between Bangkok and the autonomous zone. 

The issue of Thai-Buddhist citizens in the southern border provinces needs specific care in an autonomy agreement. This will not be easy but every effort must be made to accommodate their interests, ensure their democratic rights, and specifically ensure their safety. Tensions along ethno-religious lines have already resulted in a migration of Thai-Buddhists out of the three southern border provinces and, in some instances, Thai-Buddhists have been violently driven out in what amounts to ethnic cleansing. While human rights and safety issues are paramount, from the perspective of autonomy and the hope of establishing peace, their concerns need to be answered and included in the process of establishing peace through autonomy. 

Ultimately, while autonomy is a complex process subject to a number of major pitfalls, the fact that autonomy is gaining increased interest is a positive step in the search for a much needed political solution to the southern insurgency. While it will be a major challenge for autonomy to gain the required support from national stakeholders, the larger challenge will be to construct a durable autonomy agreement that can strike a balance between the state and the complicated grievances fueling unrest in the southern border provinces. This is not an impossible task, but it will require parties to be cognizant of the challenges, willing to compromise, and prepared to construct a highly detailed agreement.

(February 5th, 2010) KWO is again very concerned about the forced repatriation done by the Thai authority in Nong Bua refugee camp. 3 families with a total of 13 people, 9 of them are women and the rest are children, including 9 month old breastfeeding baby were forced to go back to Burma today.

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KWO is very worried for the wellbeing of this group who were sent back today as all of them are women and children. We are saddened and disappointed by the Thai authority for their lack of empathy. 

Blooming Night Zan, the joint secretary 1 of KWO said "I cannot imagine how frightened the women and children are. KWO is concerned because the weather is still too cold, we don't know how or where they will find food and our biggest concern is that they could lose their lives due to stepping on a landmine." 

Despite the international community urging the Thai government to act according to the principal of international law, the Thai government continues to ignore these grave concerns. 

Nobody can assess the situation across the border.  

Last night KWO was relieved to hear from the Chair of Karen Refugee Committee that the Thai army would not be forcing refugees to go back on the 5th of February. Today, we learned that this was not true and in reality people are being forced to go back. 

We do not know what will happen tomorrow. There is a high likelihood that the Thai authority will continue to force these refugees to return to Burma.  

We are appealing to His Majesty and the Thai government to not send the refugees back to this dangerous place. We also urge all concerned people to continue their efforts to advocate for this situation to stop. 

The Thai government has decided to put on hold its plan to send back the Karen refugees to the landmined Burmese soil, probably due to much pressure from international community. Here are interviews with the refugees by the Karen Human Rights Group on why they do not wish to be 'voluntarily repatriated' by the Thai Government.

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Interview | Naw K--- (female, 37), K--- village, Lu Pleh Township (Tha Song Yang new arrival site, February 2nd 2010)

1. Do you feel that you can stay here or do you have to leave?

Yesterday and today Thai authorities told us that we can't stay here anymore. I will have to suffer difficulties one more time. When I couldn't stay in my own village, I thought I could have stable living conditions if I entered and stayed in a refugee camp in Thailand. But now I suffer from the Thai authorities deporting me and their oppression is not different from the DKBA and SPDC.

2. If you feel that you have to leave, where do you have to go? Why do you think this?

For the time being, I don't know what to do. I absolutely dare not go back to my old village. I have no friends and relatives to stay with in Thai Karen villages. On both sides of the area [the Burma and Thai border], I can't find a safe place for me to stay. I am still waiting to see what will happen after when we receive our rations and after February 15th the refugees will spread out to different locations. I have to look for a place to stay in one location.

3. What have the Thai soldiers said to you about going back? Can you tell me exactly what they said, when and who said it?

Thai military soldiers told us that, "If you go back and stay in your own village, the DKBA and SPDC will not do anything to you. If you do not go back, we will ask big trucks to come pick you up and throw you all into the sea." The Thai authorities who often come are soldiers in black uniforms at --- [resettlement site, censored for security reasons] and some times this has included the Thai border patrol police. They come three times a day. Starting on the 1st of February 2010, at 10am, and between 5pm and 8pm.

4. Do you want to go back?

My current family attitude is: we don't want to go back to our village. Because, in the past, I couldn't live anymore in my village and I came to Thailand to stay in the refugee camp. If I go back again, it is like I will go back and be a slave for the SPDC and DKBA again.

Interview | Saw P--- (Male, 38), W--- village, Dta Greh Township (Tha Song Yang new arrival site, February 2nd 2010)

1. Do you feel that you can stay here or do you have to leave?

[The] Thais force us to leave --- [resettlement site] camp and I have to go back to my village but I dare not go back. My relatives contacted me and said, "Now the surrounding area close to your village is full of landmines and we do not know who and which groups planted the landmines. No one witnessed who planted the landmines. For this reason, do not come back at this time. If it is possible try to look for a suitable place for you there [in Thailand]."

2. If you feel that you have to leave, where do you have to go? Why do you think this?

If I go back now, I don't know the way to go back. Since when I came and stayed here, I have not gone back. I don't know if people use the old road or the new road. I do not have food there. I don't think that I can go back and stay peacefully. No one will take responsibility for our security.

3. What have the Thai soldiers said to you about going back? Can you tell me exactly what they said, when and who said it?

Thai authorities told us, "Now you can go back and stay in your village. The DKBA and SPDC will not frighten you anymore." They told us that we couldn't stay here anymore: "You can go back by yourselves. No need for us to send you back. But if you are injured or killed by landmines or if something happens to you, that is not concern with us. That is your fortune." [They came on] February 1st at 10 am and at 5pm.

4. Do you want to go back?

I don't want to go back. If I go back, I won't have food, shelter and there is no security for me in my village.

Interview | Saw M--- (male, 40), Bp--- village, Dta Greh Township (Tha Song Yang new arrival site, February 2nd 2010)

1. Do you feel that you can stay here or do you have to leave?

Now the Thai authorities came and forced us to go back and I am afraid of them very much. I dare not go anywhere now. They [will] force us to leave. The latest [they will force us to leave] is February 15th 2010. I made up my mind to go back and stay in one of the villages for a short time and when the rainy season comes, I will stay in one of the villages in Thailand.

2. If you feel that you have to leave, where do you have to go? Why do you think this?

I don't want to go back. There is no one to provide security for us. I made up my mind that I will not go back and stay in my village because of the current situation. I will stay in Thailand in one of the other places.

3. What have the Thai soldiers said to you about going back? Can you tell me exactly what they said, when and who said it?

Thai army scouts came and told us that we can't stay here anymore. "If we can't make you to leave, we will send you all to Myawaddy," said army sergeant Pi ---. I think, the DKBA gave money to this man and asked him to do this. During January he came to the camp everyday, especially on February 1st and 2nd he came three times a day. The time he normally comes is 10am, 5pm and 8pm.

4. Do you want to go back?

I don't want to go back to my village now. If I go back, I will not able to work for my livelihood very well and that is why I made up my mind that I will not go back.

Interview | Naw P--- (female, 40), Gk--- village, Lu Pleh Township (Tha Song Yang new arrival site, February 2nd 2010)

1. Do you feel that you can stay here or do you have to leave?

The difficulty I suffer now is a miserable thing for me. I can't live in --- [resettlement site] refugee camp anymore. If I go outside the camp, I can't think of where I will go and live. If I go back, I am afraid of the SPDC, DKBA and landmines. I can't figure out what to do.

2. If you feel that you have to leave, where do you have to go? Why do you think this?

If I go back to my village, I will have to do forced labour for the SPDC and DKBA: clear rubber plantation areas, clear the [military] camp compounds, be their messengers if they need people to put things on the trucks or bring rice sacks down off the trucks or other equipments. I will have to go and do that as emergency work. There is no good security condition for me. Anytime they need something, I dare not do it. But I can't refuse to go. I always have to go.

3. What have the Thai soldiers said to you about going back? Can you tell me exactly what they said, when and who said it?

The Thai army Black Rangers told us that we couldn't stay here anymore. On February 1st 2010 they told us, "You all must leave." I told them, "If we have to leave, it is better we leave the camp after we receive the rations. Now we don't have any food from last month." They asked, "When will you receive the rations?" I told them we usually receive rations at the end of the month. And they replied, "You can't do that. The latest day for you to leave is February 15th 2010. You all must leave the camp." I couldn't say anything anymore. They continued and said, "If you do not listen to us, we will send you to Myawaddy."

4. Do you want to go back?

I made up my mind that I will not go back to my village. It is difficult for me to go back. It is not easy for me to go back. I think, I will look for a place to stay here in Thailand that is suitable for me and if I am not able to do that, I will go back and stay in the Karen State in another location. I know that I can't stay but I will stay with a bad feeling. Now I strongly have hope, my country will find peace and I can go back and stay in my village peacefully.

A blog is a New Media tool that started many years ago.  It may be a diary expressing a person’s thoughts or a communications space for a social movement, depending on what the user wants it to be.  In some countries they have been very effective.

Prachatai spoke with the creator of the leading English-language news blog in Thailand http://www.asiancorrespondent.com/bangkok-pundit-blog.  It was created in 2005 by a blogger who wants to remain nameless, but has chosen to call himself Bangkok Pundit, or BP for short.  He follows Thai political stories closely as a researcher.

Most of BP’s blog is devoted to Thai politics and the state of rights and freedoms in Thailand.  Each topic posted by BP is ‘hot’, breathing down the neck of both mainstream and alternative media.  Most of the information is directly translated from Thai-language media.  So this blog is like a space for people who are not good at Thai to track the situation the way Thais do.

The blog quotes sources for all its posts and blogger’s comments are added at the end, identified by the prefix ‘BP’.

Prachatai spoke to someone so interested in events in Thailand that he runs an English-language blog so that non-Thai speakers can keep up with Thai news from Thai sources.

He carefully asked not to be identified to the extent of not answering some of our questions, which were sent by e-mail.  We present the e-mails here to demonstrate the tenor of the conversation.

Prachatai:  Why are events in Thailand so important to you that you started the Bangkok Pundit blog?  Do you see weaknesses in the English-language media that present news about Thailand?

BP:  1. If you compare it with the Thai press, I’ve not been satisfied with the news presented in English by the Nation and Bangkok Post for some time.  There were many issues that the Thai press spoke about but there was no mention of them in the English-language press.  I don’t know why, but I think some of the stories in the Thai press have interesting information that will help foreigners understand Thai politics better.  That’s one reason why I started the Bangkok Pundit blog. 

2. In 2005 when I began the blog, I was researching Thai politics and the situation in the south and writing about it daily.  That was one way I was able to develop my writing.  Some of what I wrote in the blog may be considered to be a draft of my research.  And I also get feedback from readers’ comments with fresh information and perspectives on what I have written.

Prachatai:  Can you explain what ‘Bangkok Pundit’ is?  Is it a form of media, or New Media, or your own personal space?

BP:  I want in fact to explain why I chose the name Bangkok Pundit for the blog.  

1. ‘Pundit’ in English means an expert who provides information or opinion.  The name should be Thailand Pundit since the blog gives information and opinion on Thailand, not just Bangkok.  But the Thai word ‘bandid’, from the same root, is used among Thais to mean someone who has received an educational degree and has the same meaning as the English word.  So I think the word has a meaning that I want readers to understand.

2.  I don’t know if Bangkok Pundit is New Media or not.  Bangkok Pundit is a blog giving information and opinion about Thai politics and the situation in the three border provinces.

Prachatai:  About how many people view your blog and at what time and under what conditions do numbers rise?

BP:  Since the blog moved, I don’t know how many people view it, but the number of times it is viewed is 5000 a day on average.  On Saturdays and Sundays it is 2,000-3,000.

But if the political situation is hot, like when the PAD took over the airports, the numbers of hits reaches 10,000 a day.

Prachatai:  Have you ever been threatened by any government agency?  Have you ever suffered a technical attack?  How often?

BP:  Never.  But maybe sometimes people have criticized or threatened, but I’ve taken no notice.

Prachatai:  You usually add your opinions to the news you present, like a new culture of news presentation.  Why do you add your own opinions at the ends of the posts?  (The media generally argues that in principle, reporters do not insert their opinions into their news reports.)

BP:  Because I want to separate fact from opinion, my opinions are added at the end, prefixed with ‘BP’ to make clear that this is my own opinion.  And I don’t believe that other reporters do not put their own opinions into their news reports.

Prachatai:  Do you think your blog is part of the free space for the exchange of opinion, or is part of changing the behaviour of news consumers in Thailand?

BP:  I don’t know because I can’t comment on myself.  You need someone from outside to look at what my blog is like.

Prachatai:  You monitor a lot of news in Thailand every day and upload almost all day.  How do you do it?  Do you consider this blog as your main job?  Many readers wonder what your main job is.  How can you devote so much time to this blog?

BP:  1.  What you see as uploading all day is 90% done in advance.  You may observe that there is a post at 6 or 7 o’clock, for example.  But I don’t sit and post at that time.  It’s set to post automatically.

2.  I’m very interested in the blog and think of it as a pastime.  Other people who use Facebook or other websites can spend hours on the web, but I use the time to read newspapers and write the blog. 

Prachatai:  In your opinion, what has been the most important news in the past year?

BP:  Last Songkran and the red-shirt mob.

Prachatai:  In 2010, what are the 3 most important topics that you will be following and posting on your blog?  

BP:  1.  Constitutional amendments.

2.  Seizure of the assets of Pol Lt Col Thaksin Shinawatra and what he and the red shirts will do after that.

3.  Possible dissolution of the House by Abhisit.

Prachatai:  There is talk that media rights and freedoms are shrinking.  Do you feel this, for example, in choosing topics for your blog?

BP:  I haven’t thought that the media in general and the internet media have fewer rights and freedoms, but I’m not saying that they have more or have real freedom, because I think there hasn’t been any freedom for a long time.  But these times are like a test of how much freedom the media has.  

From some perspectives, it may seem that there is less freedom, but in the era of Twitter, information cannot be hidden.  For example, when someone using the internet is arrested or threatened, in less than an hour it is a hot story.  People are asking questions, tweeting and blogging very quickly, which may give the impression that the media has less freedom.

Prachatai:  Do you think that the internet is a space where there is freedom for Thais to express their opinions after Thailand put in place the Computer Crimes Act and the government put more importance on monitoring the internet?

BP:  Yes, but there are some scary things like the arrest of Khun Chiranuch or the people who translated the Bloomberg article.  These are the most frightening cases, because while news in English is not yet being blocked and people can still read it, if it translated into Thai, the people who post it are arrested.  And they are not arrested in the normal way, but at the airport with the media alerted and taking photographs and names printed in the newspapers.  I think it is a warning that if you translate news that should not be translated, you will be treated in the same way.  

Prachatai:  From your extensive monitoring of the Thai media, what do you think of its quality, both in terms of the accuracy of what it presents and its freedom to report the news?

BP:  I think the quality of the Thai media is crap.

1.  The Thai media never quotes the source of its information.  It normally says ‘according to reports’ without specifying who or what these are.  And when one newspaper reports something, the others copy it and the information spreads without anyone knowing if it is true or where it comes from.  

2.  If they publish false information, there are no corrections, or very few.  It’s like there is no one checking facts to see how true they are.  When writers know there is no one checking, they think they can write any old garbage.  And because it’s garbage, their analyses are garbage as well.

3.  When someone says something, they print what they say without checking the facts.  If Nathan Oman says he graduated from Harvard, every newspaper will write that he says he graduated from Harvard but nobody checks, and if the information is not true, it is difficult to correct.  If no one spoon-feeds them information, writers have nothing to do, because they haven’t thought of going out and looking for information themselves.  

Fact-checking is not presenting opinions.  It means presenting information in a careful way.

Prachatai:  At present in Thailand, there is criticism of the work of the media and the New Media that has sprung up is said to be partisan or media that uses the opinions of one political faction or another, either red or yellow.  What is your perspective on this aspect of the Thai media?  Does it help promote a democratic atmosphere or does it lower the quality of news?

BP:  No answer.

Prachatai:  Many farangs who follow Thai politics often try to guess what momentous structural changes will shortly happen in Thailand.  Some say in less than 3 years, some in less than 5 years, some within 20 years.  Do you think Thailand will have the opportunity to change, and how, and will it be sooner or later?

BP:  Please let me refrain from answering.

The Interior Ministry's latest decision to introduce its own cable-television channel - dubbed 'blue-shirt television' by the media for its close association with Bhum Jai Thai Party kingmaker Newin Chidchob - will further exacerbate the already tense political situation and is a reminder of how the government still thinks crude propaganda works.

The ministry, now controlled by the party, insists it will run documentaries to protect the monarchy along with other serious content reflecting the political stance of the ministry (if not the party momentarily in control of the all-powerful ministry). But there will also be game shows and other light entertainment. 

One must ask why there is such a need now and whether such a need warrants creating a new TV channel.

Matichon group newspapers on Tuesday cited a source at the ministry as saying the true aim of the new channel was winning political converts - from the yellow-shirt People's Alliance for Democracy, and especially from the red-shirt Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship - from viewers of the current two channels, numbering a combined 5 million households nationwide, who subscribe to ASTV and DTV. Those at the ministry are gullible enough to think there will be no negative, unintended repercussions.

It seems these people still believe repeated political propaganda works and that recipients of messages accept the text as it is. Wrong! People in fact react to the same message or propaganda differently.

Do they really think that by repeatedly telling red shirts that Thaksin Shinawatra is a corrupt politician 10 times a day on the new blue-shirt channel will convince them? It will likely outrage them instead.

This is because people do not memorise messages that are sent to them. If so, the generals' ongoing reassurances that there will be "no coup" would have worked by now, and the police would not need to hunt down those spreading the rumours as if they were criminals.

The fact is, people tend to interpret and react - rightly or wrongly - based on their beliefs and assumptions. The new channel will therefore mainly enable the yellow shirts and red shirts to use it as justification supporting their belief the government is out to propagandise them - which is correct, by the way.

And since when is it the ministry's job to run a television channel? Matichon reported the ministry would mobilise tambon administrative organisations and provincial administrative organisations nationwide to watch the channel.

Since the May 1992 uprising, people should have learnt the state must have less and less control over mass media, since it will abuse it for political gain.

The military and the Prime Minister's Office already control media they propose to eventually give up, but show no sign of doing so. Now the Interior Ministry wants a propaganda channel, too. Such is the regressive state of Thai democracy.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's control of iTV was harshly criticised and rightly so, as anti-government content hardly made its way to broadcast. Why repeat the same mistake?

Newin, the man said to be behind the channel, has no history of being a royalist. But since breaking away from Thaksin in late 2008, he has behaved as if he has always been an ultra-royalist - last December organising a 4-D light-and-sound show praising His Majesty as "The Greatest of the Kings".

One would do well to be mindful about these people who can change colour quicker than the drop of a hat.

(Bangkok, 3 February 2010) The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), a membership-based organisation representing 46 human rights NGOs across Asia, expresses its grave concern over the present political repression and human rights abuse in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the presidential elections. All political actors in the country must take immediate steps to ensure due process and respect for democratic norms and human rights in Sri Lanka.

On 29 January 2010, the Commissioner of Elections of Sri Lanka declared that incumbent President Mahinda Rajapakse won the election held two days earlier. Observing the conduct of this election, independent election monitoring groups, local and international, agree that acts of election-related violence on the very day were not many. However, they said that the violations of election laws in the pre-election period were of unacceptable levels. In counting process of votes, too, serious allegations were noted in certain counting centres.

Political cartoonist Prageeth Ekneliyagoda has been missing since his abduction on the night before the election. Chandana Sirimalwatte, Editor of the pro-opposition Lanka newspaper, is in custody on unspecified charges and his office has been sealed. Several other journalists, including trade union activists in the state radio and television stations, have been subjected to assault and intimidation. Access to several websites was temporarily blocked by the state Telecommunications Regulatory Commission on and after the election day. The offices of the main opposition candidate Sarath Fonseka have been raided and his office workers and security officers detained.

Violence intensified in the aftermath, mainly intimidation and harassment of the opposition candidate and his supporters, as well as the media. This created fear for political unrest and instability that will extend into and beyond forthcoming parliamentary elections.

FORUM-ASIA is deeply concerned about these reports of human rights violations and abuses. The organisation calls upon the government of Sri Lanka to create immediately an environment that protects the rights of all citizens, specially addressing people of north and east who fear penalization for voting to the opposition. All institutions mandated to safeguard democracy and accountability, including the Constitutional Council, the National Elections Commission, the National Police Commission and the National Human Rights Commission, should be legally constituted as provided in the 17th Amendment to the country’s Constitution.

The President Mahinda Rajapakse must call on his supporters and members of the government to end political intimidation and revenge. Arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearances and torture must end and respect for freedom of expression in Sri Lanka must be respected.

He should also focus on rebuilding  economy, creating a political framework to fulfil the aspirations of all Sri Lankans, including those of minority ethnic and religious communities, especially to those who have been most affected by years of the civil war.

The revelation that PM Abhisit Vejjajiva’s father, Dr Atthasit Vejjajiva, has been contributing around 300,000 baht a month to bolster his son’s security has raised a few eyebrows. (More recent reports have suggested that this is not entirely true.)

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Most media speculation has focussed on three questions. Who has the wherewithal to drop a quiet 3.6 mil a year on anything? Does this expression of parental concern constitute an improper gift to a political office-holder? And what’s wrong with the government-provided security in the first place?

Perhaps predictably, this column asked a completely different question. What other politicians and other influential persons are the beneficiaries of similar largesse from their family members?

Prachatai quickly discovered dozens of cases where political parents have lavished favours on their offspring, but this is just run-of-the-millionaire nepotism and no surprise to anyone. More interesting were cases where children support their parents.

Newin Chidchob, for example, is technically a non-political person since he’s still under a 5-year ban from politics. This, however, has not stopped him from underwriting an extension to the health coverage that his father, Chai, gets as Speaker of the House of Representatives.

‘Certain treatments are not covered by the parliamentary health scheme’, explained a spokesperson from the family’s political headquarters, ‘especially the injections that Khun Chai finds so rejuvenating. His son also orders some blue pills from the internet that provide a pick-me-up, when necessary.’

Asked if these pharmaceutical gifts did not constitute illicit favours to an elected politician, the spokesperson didn’t think so. ‘I mean, at his age, you can’t expect him to perform without assistance, so to speak.’

The political children of Banharn Silpa-archa, daughter Kanjana and son Warawut, have long been known to provide coaching to their father on what to wear and how to behave, especially in interactions with foreigners, like Queen Elizabeth Taylor. It is not clear what financial value to put on these ‘gifts in kind’ but it is believed that without this training, Banharn’s gaffes would have been truly priceless.

Army C-in-C Anupong Paojinda has an auntie, we can reveal, who has been trying for years to take charge of his personal laundry. ‘But he will keep forgetting and send his dirty smalls to the army laundry,’ she told Prachatai. ‘Those clowns put starch in everything and he ends up wearing rock-hard undies that chafe his sensitive parts. Next thing you know some poor reporter’s had her head bitten off or he’s ordering APCs into the streets. But it’s not his fault really.’

Gen Anupong’s aunt firmly believes that her donations of a good fabric softener could dramatically ease political tensions in the country and perhaps even avert a coup.

Deputy PM Suthep Thaugsuban has a petrol-head cousin who has been tinkering with his official limousine for some months now. ‘I just added a pre-carb de-coker to give him more growl in the lower revs and tweaked his TN-51G to a finer calibration. But the vacuum-assisted side-draw differentiator that comes standard with these models pretty much sucks, so I’ll work on that just as soon as I can get hold of the car for a few hours.’

Asked if he was paid for services that should already be provided by the government car pool, the cousin laughed off the suggestion. ‘Just seeing him in the Government House car park go from nought to 60 in 5.9 is reward enough.’

Perhaps the most disturbing case that Prachatai has discovered concerns Minister of Information and Communication Technology Ranongruk Suwanchawee. Claiming severe shortages of appropriately qualified staff, she has recruited numerous members of her extended family to work in her Internet Security Operations Centre, or ‘War Room’. There they form part of the Ministry’s campaign to search out and block websites that offend the monarch and to counter internet pornography.

It appears that these young people (members of the Minister’s family with the necessary computer expertise are all teenagers) have put in thousands of unpaid hours in the hunt for cyber-criminals. The Minister’s office brushed aside allegations of impropriety and illegal use of child labour, pointing to the success achieved.

Although only a handful of pro-republican sites have been identified in the past few months, the other focus of the campaign has enjoyed huge success. ‘These kids seem to be able to check out porno sites all day long,’ enthused the Minister.

About author: Bangkokians with long memories may remember his irreverent column in The Nation in the 1980's. During his period of enforced silence since then, he was variously reported as participating in a 999-day meditation retreat in a hill-top monastery in Mae Hong Son (he gave up after 998 days), as the Special Rapporteur for Satire of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and as understudy for the male lead in the long-running ‘Pussies -not the Musical' at the Neasden International Palladium (formerly Park Lane Empire).

The Karen Women Organization is urgently appealing to the Royal Thai Government not to forcibly repatriate over 3,000 Karen refugees staying in Tha Song Yang, Tak Province, back to a heavily land-mined war-zone in Burma. The majority of the refugees are women and children.

This group of refugees have been told by the Thai Army that they must all be returned to Burma by February 15. The refugees were told that actions to remove them will begin on February 5th, this week. They are now living in fear of imminent forced repatriation into an area which is heavily land-mined, and where active conflict can re-ignite at any moment.  

On January 28, the local Authority  Thai Army and his men forced 50 refugees from this group back across the border between 9 to 11 am to start cleaning up their homes in the village of Ler Per Her in preparation for their return. This included 20 women and girls, some under 16 years of age. 

However, KWO would like to state clearly that this area is not safe at all and refugees groups are not willing to return at this point in time. In recent months, five refugees from the area have been either injured or killed by landmines when slipping back into Burma to look after livestock they left behind. This included a 13-year-old boy whose leg was blown off in August last year, and a woman who was 8 months pregnant had her foot blown apart on January 18, 2010. 

Blooming Night Zan, Joint Secretary 1 of KWO said, "This evidence of people stepping on the landmines is a sure sign that the situation is still very dangerous. Sending refugees back against their will into such a dangerous situation violates the international law of non-refoulement. Although the Thai government is not a signatory of the Refugee Convention, the KWO is very grateful to His Majesty the Thai King, and the Thai government, for a long history of kindness to refugees. We appeal to the Thai authorities now to show your humanitarian kindness again."

The Karen refugees fled from fighting in the Ler Per Her area in Karen State, Burma, in June 2009. The refugees were granted temporary refuge in three locations, Mae U Su, Mae Salit and Nong Bua, but have not yet been allowed to move to Mae La refugee camp in Tak Province. Since their arrival, local Thai authorities have repeatedly pressured the refugees to return home despite evidence that the area is still very dangerous.

The Karen Women Organization is gravely concerned at the planned forced repatriation of these refugees into such a dangerous area and we urgently appeal to the Royal Thai Government to halt the repatriation and continue to provide these refugees with protection on Thai soil.

‘Thai E-News: News about Thailand that you may not have read in the news’ is the slogan of one of Thailand’s leading political websites.  It has only content and no web board.  It is unabashedly ‘red’, but red with a strange smell.  It posts critical points of view from all circles.

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Prachatai talks to Somsak Phakdidej, one of the founders, to find out how he thinks, how he works, and what his values are.

Thai E-News was born in silence, lives in mystery and does not know how mass media circles will define it.  Maybe as ‘fake media’, ‘a tool of politicians’, or ‘an example of using media to start a political war’.  Known as an alternative site that posts news that no one puts on normal blogs, it gets more than 40,000 clicks a day.

Today we will look closely at the phenomenon of news in cyberspace, where the power of producing and consuming news is in the hands of everyone equally.  Somsak Phakdidej is the secret name of one of the founders of Thai E-News.  He knew nothing of IT but is an active citizen sympathetic to democracy.  The set-up of this website is strange because the working team is small and they don’t know each other personally.  Their common background is the Ratchadamnoen room on the Pantip web board where they developed similar views in discussion since 2005-6.

‘Our policy is that you don’t need to know me, I don’t need to know you, but we know each other’s opinions.

‘The Ratchadamnoen room had both pro and con Thaksin opinions.  I used to be with the opposition.  I opposed Thaksin, like the NGOs, on account of his multiple conflicts of interest.  When Sondhi Limthongkul started to become the centre of the rallies close to the coup, I got the sense that they were going beyond the role of a people’s movement.  And then in the evening of 19 September 2006, the coup happened.

‘Thai E-News was created on 5 November 2006, in a very tense atmosphere, since Pantip’s policy was to close the Ratchadamnoen room “for security reasons”.

‘At the time of the coup, many people, both pro-democracy and pro-Thaksin, had nowhere to go, so they crowded into the Prachatai web board, including me.’

Somsak says that Thai E-News was created because they saw a big problem with the media.  The mainstream media have a clear bias in presenting information.  

‘What the Thaksin side did was completely black.  So we wanted to create a media that wasn’t an alternative media, but counter-media, against the flow of the mainstream media, which had become a tool of the dictatorship.’

The principle of the counter-media is ‘anything that is not mainstream media news will be our news. Any mainstream media news that is propaganda or black propaganda, we will counter with the truth from another perspective.  When the Thaksin interview on Times Online is translated carefully, it is clear that Thaksin said one thing while the mainstream media claimed that he was going to overthrow the institution.  We took on the job of translating the whole thing.’

‘Our standpoint is pro-democracy.  Being pro-Thaksin is a secondary issue.’

The content that appears on the weblog is all kinds, as diverse as a big pot of mixed curry, with political analyses, political history, critical articles of the people’s movement, news that is not political like UFOs (which turned out to be balloons), news of the red shirt movement, and so on.

‘We get lots of news on activities sent in from all corners of the country and overseas, and when the activity has happened, the organizer has to send us a report because we have no reporters.’   

All content relies on e-mail conversations among the team and each does what they are good at – writing, analysis, translation.  Some are good at technical things and some like to surf and know where there are things they can take.

‘I have experience in media.  I know media and I know the nature of media very well.  We are a counter-current in everything, including media.  We see shocking things in other fields – among NGOs, human rights people, activists, academics – who naturally should be pro-democracy from what we know of their background and experience.  So we started to analyze why these people mostly approve of and accept dictatorship.’

Apart from networks who send in stuff, many “cyber-reporters” from various web boards report on important events and make observations, like the research that found that the red-shirt woman who was dragged by the hair wasn’t at the Din Daeng flats and it wasn’t because of the frustration of the people in the Din Daeng flats as the mainstream media reported.

‘Doing counter-stories all the time is tiring.  You have to research, get information for comparison.  In the end, the picture of the woman dragged by the hair got an award.

‘We use a blog because it’s free and it’s easy.  We use just two things – labour and heart.  No expenses; no need for profit.  And it’s easy enough for people with no IT experience.’

When the counter-current position is clear, the question is whether Thai E-News is propaganda for the opposite side.

‘When we started there were lots of questions about this.  We even asked each other (laughs).  

‘In fact we are concerned about one or two points.  One is credibility.  We quote here and there in reasonable detail.  It should be credible.  Two, people may say it is propaganda against propaganda.  On the team we have talked about this a lot.  If it’s black, we are white.  If it’s white, we are black. That would not make any difference.  We think that at least we should not use black propaganda, the kind that puts out lies.  We’ve never done that.  If the reds do something bad, we’ve never said it was good.

‘For example, when the PAD rallied on October 7, we don’t know what happened but someone lost a leg and there were deaths.  We have to report deaths and injuries because they were seen.  Many people on different web boards suggested he was already an amputee.

‘But if you say we use propaganda on one side to fight the other side, that could be true.  When the mainstream pushes society all one way, we see that it’s wrong and we suggest, from the pro-democracy side, that the truth is something else.  If you call that propaganda, we have to admit that we have to do this.’

But even if this is their job, they are clearly part of the red-shirt movement, but with sufficient independence.  They express disagreement with some of the red-shirt movement, like their statement disagreeing with the march on Gen Prem Tinasulanonda’s house on 19 September 2009 because Gen Prem wasn’t there.  Going there risked getting suppressed for nothing.  Somsak says that this counts as the first statement since Thai E-News was set up.  

‘If Thaksin does something crazy or goes astray, or the red shirts do something that we say is senseless, we have the freedom to criticize.  We should not get restrained for fear of disrupting the movement.  Such fear would make it even worse that disrupting the movement.’

In Somsak’s analysis, his readers are ‘reformers’ because on the basis of political opinion polls, republican sympathies are rare.  Most want the 1997 Constitution, new elections.  Most readers, 45%, are from Bangkok, 10% from overseas and 35% from upcountry.

A survey of the webpage at the time of the petition found that 75% wanted amendments to the constitution and only 2% approved of the amnesty petition for Thaksin.

‘We believe that people are going beyond Thaksin, at least people who read Thai E-News.’  Somsak says that they’ve kept statistics since the beginning, and between April 2007 and now, Thai E-News has averaged 40,000 hits a day, rising to 100,000 at hot times.

Whether you like the reports, articles and analyses that you read, you can’t exchange comments at the end of the piece or criticize them on the web board because there is no web board.  The creators explain that they had no expertise in that, and they did not aim to build a two-way communication forum like most websites with political content.

‘If we allowed comments, it would be difficult to look after.  It means a lot of work and we would have to find someone to do it.  It doesn’t fit with our structure, which is not looking for even the slightest profit.’

When asked about their goals or self-evaluation about things to change, the Thai E-News people modestly excuse themselves.  ‘Our readership is very small.  About what changes these readers can make, I have no great hopes.  At least pro-democracy people read us.  Many people who hate Thaksin read us.  We propose no civil war, though the current situation is leading to this.  At Songkran, the red shirts only had people who speak.  Now some soldiers are joining.  Khun Panlop is preparing soldiers.  There is talk that this time you shoot and I will shoot back, while the one side that has state power is ready to use violence.  All through history, we see that this side likes to use violence against the democracy movement.  Furthermore they have mainstream media put out biased reports that your lot are the ones who create violence, who like violence.  What can be done to restrain the army peacefully, such as amending a rotten constitution, promising to respect the voice of the people?’

If Thai Rak Thai could come back, would the job of Thai E-News be finished?

‘We basically believe in democracy.  The Thaksin issue is secondary.  In the red-shirt media, there are many shades of red – scarlet, rose, pink.  We stick to the basic principles of democracy.  What we’ve always tried to propose is democracy.  We like to cite the principles of democracy from the People’s Party and Pridi and how we will move forward, the principles of democracy as Socrates talked about them, sovereignty of the people, the principle of freedom, the principle of equality, the principle of law, respect for the voice of the majority while not abusing the voice of the minority.  

‘If you ask about new elections and Thaksin’s return, we think it’s no big problem.  The big problem is when will this country respect the principles of democracy and observe the rules of democracy.  This is what we have to accept.  If there is an election tomorrow and Bhumjai Thai wins, we should accept it.  An ABAC poll gave Abhisit a 70% approval rating.  If he wins the election, we have to accept it.  But the problem of politics here in our country is that there is a government up above a government, and the principles of democracy have been violated.

‘If the situation returned to normal, we had democracy and the media did its job, then I don’t know what the counter-current would be counter to.

‘But these times may be the worst for freedom.  People have been arrested on many charges.  

‘Today I should say who I am and what I think, but I can’t.’

As a fan of Kdrama, indelibly touched like so many others in 2002 who would stop in at some public place or restaurant in South Korea hooked on catching episodes of Winter Sonata while it was being broadcast, I turn to readers and fellow fans to help make sense of what is going on in South Korea. Now that Queen Seon Deok is over, there is SBS’s Don’t Hesitate to lend itself as an interpretive device for what has been going on in the arts, culture and media sectors this past year from the illegal firings of Arts Council Korea (ARKO) Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Kim Jung-heun to the attack on the Korean National University of the Arts. Is Lee Myung-bak’s administration representative of Jang Soo Hyun on a course of revenge, angered by the years of unacknowledged pain the conservative right suffered under the late president Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations? And, like the lead character, will its actions end up generating only more hurt for itself, while damaging its self-image?

The setting for this particular drama revolves around the international campaign that has been launched in an effort to save Mediact, a public media institution that also made its appearance in 2002 and emerged out of a collaborative proposal submitted by the Association of Korean Independent Film and Video (KIFV) to create an institution that could facilitate the realization of broadcast, cable and satellite obligations written into the 2000 broadcast legislation requiring the airing of viewer-produced content. The proposal was visionary in that it essentially provided public funding to support the realization of communication rights as a human right, but also in how it imagined a center could steward the development of the public media sector by providing support for local media center development, life-long media education, trainings, and research on appropriate media and technology policies. Currently, this very institution is currently under threat of being dismantled by the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) now under the authority of the Culture Ministry headed by Minister Yu, and protest is gathering to prevent the handover of its public media center facilities and contract to a conservative organization with inexperienced staff who have newly emerged on the scene.

Much of the protest tends to register deep concern due to Mediact’s considerable and positive contributions to the perception held by an international community about South Korea, and demands an immediate retraction and apology from KOFIC staff. It has also been remarked upon by many, as indicated by endorsements coming in from South Africa to Japan to nations in the EU, about how Mediact operates in a way that has been instructive about how not to silo off filmmakers, artists, media educators, media policy makers, and users away from each other but instead convene them together to create society-wide investments in the country‘s ability to develop a vibrant public media sector and lead internationally in media literacy, communication rights and democracy, and media policy implementation. There are some who go further to allege it is a mistake for KOFIC’s new chairman, Cho Hee-Moon, to run South Korea off course in this manner.

Mediact working in tandem with KIVF has supported efforts since its inception to ensure that Korean independent filmmaking has been well represented by its independent documentary filmmaking, punctuated by an early work by filmmaker and former KIVF Chairman Kim Dong-won’s Sanggye-dong Olympics (1988) and then joined this decade by his Repatriation (2004), Lee Chang-jae’s Between (2006), Kim Myeong-jun’s Our School (2007) and last year’s record-breaking documentary film Old Partner by Lee Chung-ryul. While last year was not an exception, its efforts became especially affirmed by the warm reception given internationally to Yang Ik-June’s Breathless. Even if someone has not benefited directly from having accessed the facilities, enrolled in a media workshop, attended a conference hosted by Mediact, or participated in any one of the international associations or convenings that staff from Mediact has represented South Korea in that range from the MacBride Round Table on Communication held in Seoul to phases of the World Summit on Information Society, anyone who has been privy to pick up a selection from the Mediact DVD collection of independent documentary and experimental works from South Korea can at least attest to this.

Finally, some others who are hearing about KOFIC’s decision to shutdown Mediact, a decision that follows the closure of IndieSpace, Seoul’s dedicated venue to screen independent films in December, offer the criticism that perhaps misreads the direction of KOFIC’s leadership and links it with a commercial overinvestment in prolonging or renewing the exportation of Hallyu, Korean new wave and KDramas. These same critics underscore that South Korea’s position relative to cultural production will always be punctuated by the remarkable content of the independent films produced in the past decade. I do not entirely disagree, however, the situation also seems marked by a partisan reversal and as the latter episodes in the Kdrama Don’t Hesitate spoken through the character of Han Tae Woo seem to suggest, rather than give in to vengeance, perhaps Chairman Cho Hee-Moon and Minister Yu should proceed in a different way. In the meantime, I want to stand up for both independent filmmaking and popular culture, and suggest that what has been distinguishable about South Korea is how wide its horizon in media and cultural production and communication rights became, and how alarmingly narrow it is now becoming.

A press conference organized by a voluntary group of Mediact members, independent filmmakers, and media education teachers will be held in front of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in Seoul, Jan. 29.

Ends.

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Petition to save Mediact

Mediact, an important resource for media education and activism is under threat. To read more about it in english see this petition page. 

http://www.gopetition.com/online/33662.html

We now join those concerned over the regression of democracy in South Korea that has now taken the form of an attack on Mediact, South Korea’s first public media center that has since its founding represented South Korea internationally as a leader in communication rights and democracy, media literacy, intellectual property rights, and public interest media.

Since 2002, Mediact has stewarded a contract to support independent film and video makers, media policy development, lifelong media education and public access. For seven years, it has provided an infrastructure focusing on the potential of creating a public media sector based on both shifting technological possibilities of access to the media and ongoing political democratization processes taking place in South Korea. 

Mediact’s facilities are funded by the Korean Film Council (KOFIC), what is supposed to be an autonomous organization funded by the central government to promote Korean cinema within the country and overseas, and an independent activist organization managed by the Association of Korean Independent Film & Video (KIFV). We are highly alarmed by the new KOFIC Chairman's recent decision to dismantle Mediact and force its staff to resign as of February 1.

As Mediact’s counterparts in the international community, we have been long inspired by Mediact’s visionary leadership in the areas of media policy, media education, media production and communication rights. We, the undersigned, urge the government of President Lee Myung-bak to recognize its responsibility for the democracy that has regressed and reorient itself as a government that respects the people's sovereignty and South Korea's continued leadership in media and communication rights. We ask KOFIC together with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism to reverse this decision immediately.