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SYDNEY, Oct 3 (IPS Asia-Pacific) – Over the last decade or so, China’s deft use of soft power has seen South-east Asian neighbours’ view of it change from a looming threat to a largely friendly, if still imposing, giant to the north.

   But while that much is clear, what is not is whether China’s ‘kinder’ profile will allow countries downstream of the Mekong River it shares with Laos, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia real opportunities to discuss the fate of this shared resource – and sensitive issues like hydropower construction on it.

   Some analysts are more optimistic than others. “China has been a confirmed multilateralist since the mid-nineties,” said Steven Fitzgerald, professor at the University of Sydney at a recent conference here on ‘A Greater Mekong? Poverty, Integration and Development’. “I think Chinese foreign policy stand is an interesting opportunity for the region,” he added.

   But those like Milton Osborne of the Lowy Institute, an authority on South-east Asia and Mekong issues who has written several books on these, advise caution. To what extent China’s sweetness means it can or will adopt policies other than those in its own interests – such as listening to downstream nations’ concerns about China’s dams causing erratic water levels and fears about its impact on agriculture – is far from clear, he says.

   “They look a lot better than they did 10 years ago, but it’s not as rosy as some people would like it to be,” Osborne pointed out.

   So far, China has pretty much been able to get what it wants. In 1993, it completed construction of the Manwan dam in the Mekong’s upper reaches in south-west Yunnan province, called the Lancang. A second dam, the Dachaoshan, is under construction, and more plans are reportedly afoot.

   China, along with Burma, Thailand and Laos, pushed for the 2000 navigation agreement they signed to widen the upper reaches of the river in order to allow bigger and heavier commercial vessels to pass through. In early 2007, China used the river to ferry oil up the river.

   China’s official policy toward its Mekong neighbours has been that it is committed to be a “friendly neighbour” and sees other countries in the region as “partners”.

   But it does not help that there remains a lack of an institutional venue – whether formally or informally -- for Mekong countries to engage with China on matters than involve all six countries of this region, which have been in a process of regional integration since 1992.

   While they are all under what the Asian Development Bank calls the ‘Greater Mekong Subregion’, there is not quite an inter-governmental or common forum where all are equal members. The GMS programme, facilitated by the Manila-based bank, is very much a voluntary programme of cooperation focused on building physical connectictivity through roads and transboundary corridors, energy sharing grids and the like.

   The Vientiane-based Mekong River Commission has the mandate to focus on the river, but is often criticised for failing to do more to at least get the downstream countries’ voices heard.

   It comprises Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia – the countries in the lower river basin. China and Burma are observers in the commission, something that MRC officials point to as a positive development but which critics say means little. In recent years, China has agreed to share information on releases of water from its Lancang dams, but as one speaker said, this applies only to the rainy season when it is information about the dry-season water levels that matters.

   Fitzgerald threw up the idea of regional integration perhaps needing to be in wider environment with more players, such as perhaps the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), the main diplomatic grouping in South-east Asia where all but China are members.

   But Mekong issues do not quite rank high enough in the concerns of ASEAN, which also has as members Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Mekong countries have not really used ASEAN as a platform from with to talk to China.

   What ASEAN has had experience is, however, is in getting China to agree to address as a multilateral matter a touchy issue like disputed claims over the Spratly islands in the South China Sea.

   After years of informal discussions among think tanks and negotiations, and against the backdrop of given China’s refusal to deal with the Spratlys as anything other than a bilateral matter with different claimants, Beijing agreed to sign the Code of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. ASEAN had been working on this declaration for some time, meant to get all parties to “exercise self-restraint” to prevent the escalation of conflict in the area.

   This was after tense episodes over the Spratlys, including China’s building of so-called fishermen’s shelters in the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratlys.

   But also as part of its use of its soft power – which Fitzgerald defines as “the ability to influence by means of attraction” – China has been busy investing in good neighbourly ties in South-east Asia in the last decade. Today, this a key factor in whether, and how, countries can bring up with Beijing sensitive issues like how its Lancang dams might impact on downstream communities.

   In the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s refusal to budge on the yuan was a measure appreciated by the region already reeling from this shock. “It’s a totally different relationship now and than in 1997,” Osborne added.

   Today, China is among the top foreign investors in Cambodia and its Sino Hydro Corp. is involved in the 280 million U.S. dollar Kamchay dam project -- the largest foreign investment in Cambodian history. It is also continues to be a source of aid for countries like Cambodia and Laos, and has written off some of Cambodia’s debt.

   One speaker at the University of Sydney conference suggested that apart from advocacy, it was important to buttress arguments with sound research on the impact of the upstream dams. “We must combine political will with study,” he said.

   Chinese officials have said that the Lancang dams in fact help water supply during the dry season – and that allegations about the harm they cause are exaggerated that the country contributes just 16 percent to the Mekong’s flows.

   Over the years, there have been attempts to get Chinese officials of different levels to be at non-official meetings, seminars and stakeholders’ dialogues so they can share their views first-hand – and listen to the views of other academics, analysts or government officials from other Mekong countries.

   Philip Hirsch of the Australia Mekong Resource Centre, which organised the conference here with AusAid, explains that while non-government groups in China have been able to influence some hydropower plans such as those affecting the Nu (Salween) River in Yunnan province, “one would not expect that this will say the Chinese government and other agencies if they conclude that a dam needs to be built” on the Mekong.

   Any shift in China’s persona in the Mekong region, if it comes, will come slowly, analysts agree. “What change will come will be slow and incremental,” said Fitzgerald. (END/IPSAP/MPWR/JS/07-08)

(*Johanna Son is director for IPS Asia-Pacific news agency. It is a partner organisation in the M-POWER network (www.mpowernet.org), and runs an annual media fellowship programme for Mekong journalists called Imaging Our Mekong programme (www.newsmekong.org.)